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TAKINGS LAW-Is INVERSE CONDEMNATION AN APPROPRIATE REM-

EDY FOR DUE PROCESS VIOLATIONS?-San Diego Gas & Electric Co.
v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621 (1981).

In 1966 the San Diego Gas & Electric Company acquired 412 acres of
land in the northern part of the city of San Diego as a potential site for a
proposed nuclear power plant. IAt the time of acquisition approximately
116 acres of the tract were zoned for industrial use, with the remainder in
a temporary agricultural "holding" category. 2 The city enacted a master
plan in 1967 designating most of the tract for future industrial use. 3 In
June of 1973 the city downzoned thirty-nine acres from industrial to agricultural use 4 and also changed the designation of 214 acres on the master
plan from "future industrial" to "open space.'' 5 The amended master
plan explicitly acknowledged that the open-space designation did not nec6
essarily prohibit the placement of a nuclear plant on the land.
1. The tract included a 214-acre estuary and wildife refuge known as the Los Penasquitos Lagoon, The lagoon was the focus of this action in San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego,
450 U.S. 621 (1981). These undeveloped acres are low-lying and serve as a drainage basin and flood
plain for three separate watersheds. In addition, much of this same area is subject to-tidal inundation
and standing water. Id. at 624. These factors become significant in assessing the validity of San
Diego's inclusion of the lagoon in its open-space plan. See note 5 infra. The lagoon's characteristics
indicate that the city acted in good faith and in furtherance of the public welfare by recognizing the
critical importance of preventing the destruction of rare estuarian habitats in semi-arid climates. The
furtherance of such public interest is a prerequisite to any municipal land use regulation. See text
accompanying note 46 infra.
2. Land in a "holding" category has not been officially zoned, but rather is under study to determine what the permissible land uses should be. Holding zones are also referred to as "stopgap ordinances." I A. RATHKOPF, THE LAW OF ZONING AND PLANNING § 11.01 (4th ed. 1975). "Holding"
categories are generally used by municipalities to limit land use to existing uses, even though there is
no intention to maintain the status quo indefinitely. Although often attacked as being unfair, the
reasonable use of holding zones is generally upheld. E.g., State ex. rel. Randall v. Snohomish
County, 79 Wn. 2d 619,488 P.2d 511 (1971).
3. Enacting such a plan does not affect the actual zoning of specific tracts. 1 A. RATHKOPF, supra
note 2, § 11.01. The master plan does, however, suggest the probable direction of future zoning
changes. This is especially true for acreage which is classified in the temporary "holding" category.
Thus, by enacting the master plan, the city had not officially changed the zoning of the company's
tract. Nevertheless, the city's action did raise the expectation that when the lands were taken from the
temporary "holding" category and permanently zoned, that zone would probably be "industrial."
See id.
4. San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 146 Cal. Rptr. 103, 109 (Cal. Ct. App.
1978) (opinion vacated by the California Supreme Court's grant of the city's petition for a hearing).
After the rezoning, 77 acres remained in the industrial zone, 39 acres were placed in the permanent
agricultural zone, and the rest of the tract remained in the agricultural "holding" category with the
provision that 50 of those acres would be considered for future industrial use. Id. at 109 n. 1.
5. Id. The city was required by state statute to adopt an open-space element to its master plan for
the purpose of "comprehensive and long-range preservation and conservation of.open-space land
within its jurisdiction." CAL. GovT. CODE § 65563 (West Supp. 1981).
6. The amended master plan suggested, however, that the city acquire the 214 acres designated
as open space and preserve them as parkland. Unfortunately, in September of 1973 the electorate
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The company was nonetheless forced to abandon its plans for a nuclear
power plant after the discovery of an off-shore seismic fault. 7 The company was thus confronted with the prospect of selling the land subject to
its "open-space" designation on the master plan. Because that designation depressed the land's speculative value, the company sued the city
alleging that the 1973 zoning change and adoption of the open-space plan
was a "taking" of the company's land in violation of the fifth amendment
of the United States Constitution. 8 The company claimed "that the city
had deprived it of the entire beneficial use of the property" 9 and requested
an inverse condemnation award of over six million dollars. 10 The San
Diego County Superior Court held the city liable for inverse condemnation and a jury set damages at over three million dollars. "1The California
Court of Appeal, however, ultimately reversed the judgment of the supeturned down a city bond issue that would have provided funds for the purchase of the land. San Diego
Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621,625 (1981).
7. Id. at 626 n.6.
8. "[P]rivate property [shall not] be taken for public use, without just compensation." U.S.
CONST. amend. V. The just compensation clause of the fifth amendment is applicable to state actions
through the 14th amendment. Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 160
(1980). Fifth amendment "takings" are also referred to as actions for "inverse condemnation." The
concepts are rooted in the law of eminent domain.
Normally, if a municipality is going to take private property for public use, it must purchase, or
condemn, that property under the power of eminent domain. If the municipality fails to provide just
compensation through eminent domain proceedings before the taking or damaging of the property,
the property owner is entitled to institute a suit for inverse condemnation to compel an ex post facto
recovery of just compensation. See generally Van Alstyne, Taking Or Damaging By Police Power:
The Search ForInverse Condemnation Criteria,44 S. CAL. L. REV. 1 (1970) (discussing concept of
inverse condemnation and analyzing irreconcilable judicial applications); Note, Inverse Condemnation: Its Availability in Challenging the Validity of a Zoning Ordinance, 26 STAN. L. REv. 1439
(1974) (criticizing extension of inverse condemnation remedy to zoning cases).
The company also pleaded that the San Diego ordinance violated the eminent domain provisions of
the state constitution, CAL. CONST. art. I, § 19, which parallel the guarantees of the fifth amendment.
See San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 146 Cal. Rptr. 103, 109-110 (Cal. Ct. App.
1978) (opinion vacated by the California Supreme Court's grant of the city's petition for a hearing).
9. San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621,626 (1981).
10. In its original complaint the company pleaded alternatively for both inverse condemnation
and injunctive or declaratory relief. Id. Granting the request for declaratory relief would result in the
invalidation of the ordinance, which would return the land to its zoning status before the 1973
changes, but no compensation would be given. The theory behind such relief is that the ordinance
violates the 14th amendment's due process clause and is therefore void. See note 48 and accompanying text infra. The city would be free, however, to acquire the land through eminent domain proceedings and reenact the ordinance.
Granting inverse condemnation, on the other hand, assumes that the city has already taken the
property, but has failed to provide just compensation. Consequently, the court would order the city to
keep the property but to compensate the company for their loss. See note 8 supra.
11. San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 627 (1981). The superior
court had dismissed the claim for declaratory relief as an improper challenge to the validity of a
legislative act. Id. at 626. Consequently, the court considered the challenge to the ordinance only as
an unconstitutional taking.
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rior court. 12 The appellate court held that the company could not recover

monetary relief through inverse condemnation, but rather that its sole
remedy was to seek invalidation of the offending ordinances. 13 The California Supreme Court denied review and the company appealed to the
United States Supreme Court.14 The company argued that the California
court could not automatically deny it a recovery for inverse condemnation.
In San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. City of San Diego, 15 the Court,
after hearing arguments on the merits, dismissed the case on jurisdictional
grounds. The majority said that although the California court had decided
that monetary compensation was not an appropriate response to the company's takings claim, the court had not rendered a final judgment or decree upon which an appeal could be heard. 16
Four dissenting Justices, led by Justice Brennan, interpreted the California Court of Appeal's action as a ruling that no taking had occurred, 17
thus constituting a final judgment.' 8 The dissent then said that a land12. The California Court of Appeal originally affirmed the superior court's decision. San Diego
Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 146 Cal. Rptr. 103 (Cal. Ct. App. 1978) (opinion vacated by
the California Supreme Court's grant of the city's petition for a hearing). In discussing the appropriate course of action for over-regulated landowners, the appellate court said:
If the City has acted arbitrarily or discriminatorily in passing the ordinance in question, the
landowner should use administrative mandate to have the ordinance changed. . . ;if the City
has enacted an unconstitutional or invalid zoning ordinance, the landowner may seek mandate,
injunctive relief or declaratory relief. . . and the governmental agency is immune from any tort
liability. . . ; if the zoning is valid but so harsh that it deprives the owner of all beneficial use
of its land, there has been a condemnation and damages are proper ....
Id. at 114. On June 13, 1978, the appellate court denied the city's petition fora rehearing. Id. at 103.
The California Supreme Court granted the city's petition for a rehearing, but before the hearing
took place the court decided Agins v. City of Tiburon, 24 Cal. 3d 266, 598 P.2d 25, 157 Cal. Rptr.
372 (1979), affd, 447 U.S. 255-(1980), which disallowed inverse condemnation awards based on
zoning regulations. See notes 64-66 and accompanying text infra. The court then transferred San
Diego Gas & Electric back to the appellate court for reconsideration. The appellate court, upon reconsideration, reversed the trial court's decision on the basis that Agins mandated the result. San
Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 629 (1981).
13. The court of appeal, in an unpublished opinion, held that the company's "remedy is mandamus or declaratory relief, not inverse condemnation." Id. at 630. This represents a complete reversal from the appellate court's first holding. See note 12supra.
14. The Court granted certiorari, but postponed consideration of its jurisdiction until hearing the
merits of the case. San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 630 (1981).
15. 450U.S. 621 (1981).
16. ld.at630n.10.
17. The dissent's position was that just compensation must accompany a taking. Because the
California courts refused a monetary remedy, they had therefore implicitly ruled that no taking had
occurred. See note 78 and accompanying text infra.
18. The dissent said that "[s]ince the Court of Appeal held that no Fifth Amendment 'taking' had
occurred, no just compensation was required. This is a classic final judgment." 450 U.S. at646. The
dissent recognized that the company was not left without a remedy and that the litigation had not yet
reached a natural culmination, even though the California courts refused to grant an inverse condemnation award. Id. at 643. Thus, the final decision that the dissent reviews is essentially the California
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owner subjected to overly restrictive zoning cannot be limited to seeking
the invalidation of the ordinance, but rather must be allowed to claim just
compensation for the time that the regulation was in effect. 19 This pro20
posal thus advocates the creation of a "temporary taking" doctrine.
The dissent's view is noteworthy because although Justice Brennan
spoke only for a minority of four, Justice Rehnquist stated in his concurring opinion that if he were able to reach the merits of the case, he
"would have little difficulty in agreeing with much of what is said in the
dissenting opinion of Justice Brennan.' '21 Furthermore, the majority also
expressed reservations about the California Court of Appeal's refusal to
allow inverse condemnation awards for land use takings. 22 Since San
Diego Gas & Electric, Justice O'Connor has replaced one of the Brennan
minority. Nevertheless, a majority of the Supreme Court may be ready to
rule that a municipality that overly restricts land use through zoning must
compensate the landowner for the use of the property during the time the
23
overly restrictive zoning ordinance was in effect.
This Note first examines the Supreme Court cases that involve fifth
amendment taking and fourteenth amendment due process challenges to
land use regulations. Next, this Note discusses the meaning of Justice
Brennan's proposals and their potential effect on land use planning and
zoning. This Note suggests that overly restrictive zoning ordinances
should not be viewed as a taking requiring just compensation. Instead
these ordinances should be viewed as invalid exercises of the municipality's police power because of their failure to provide substantive due
process to the landowner. 24 The landowner's remedy should therefore be
the invalidation of the ordinance, not just compensation. 25 If the invalidation of the zoning ordinance is not adequate relief for the landowner, this
Note proposes to let landowners sue for a monetary award under 42

courts' position that inverse condemnation actions are never appropriate challenges to zoning regulations.
19.

Id. at 658-59.

20.

Id. at 657. See text accompanying notes 86-87 infra.

21.

450 U.S. at 633-34.

22. The majority did not discuss whether state courts may appropriately deny inverse condemnation awards in response to invalid zoning, but they were "frank to say that the federal constitutional
aspects of that issue are not to be cast aside lightly.
... Id. at 633.
23. Even if Justice Brennan's proposals are not explicitly adopted by the United States Supreme
Court in the near future, state courts-which have the primary responsibility of applying land use
law-will certainly notice that this proposal appears to command the majority of the Court. Already
one state court has embraced the proposals of Justice Brennan. Burrows v. City of Keene, 121 N.H.
590, 432 A.2d 15, 19-20 (1981).
24. See note 48 and accompanying text supra.
25. See text accompanying notes 55-56 infra.
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U.S.C. § 1983,26 which allows damages if an individual's constitutional
rights are violated.
I.

LEGAL BACKGROUND

Municipal ordinances that regulate land use are exercises of the municipality's police power. 27 Although landowners may challenge these ordinances on procedural grounds, 28 landowners' more common complaints
allege substantive defects. These complaints involve two different legal

theories. First, the landowner may claim that the ordinance is an invalid
exercise of the municipality's police power. 29 This is essentially a request
to have the ordinance invalidated. Second, the landowner may attempt to
force the government to pay for the economic burden the regulation creates rather than attempt to seek the invalidation of the ordinance. This
second theory is based on the takings clause of the fifth amendment and
on the law of eminent domain. 30 The interrelationship between these two
theories is dealt with by the Brennan dissent in San Diego Gas & Electric
and is the subject of this Note.
A.

EarlyHistory of Challengesto Land Use Regulations

Courts originally upheld the authority of governments to regulate private land use on principles relating to the law of nuisance. 31 Municipalities had authority to abate specific existing land uses on behalf of the public just as neighbors could sue to enjoin a nuisance on their own behalf.
Not surprisingly, the prevailing doctrine established that the municipality
26. (1976). See note 127 infra.
27. Police powers are based on the state's inherent authority to enact laws that promote the public
health, safety, morals, and general welfare. To the extent that land use ordinances accomplish these
purposes, they are valid exercises of police power. See I A. RATHKOPF, supra note 2, § 2.01. Individual municipalities have the power to enact land use ordinances only to the extent that the state has
granted this authority through a state enabling act. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE ch. 36.70 (1981).
28. For a particular municipal ordinance to be valid it must conform to the procedural requirements of the enabling act. See note 27 supra.
29. The standard criteria used to evaluate the validity of police power actions in general was put
forth in Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133 (1894). The Lawton Court stated:
To justify the state. . . interposing its authority in behalf of the public, it must appear-First,
that the interests of the public . . . require such interference; and second, that the means are
reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose, and not unduly oppressive upon
individuals.
Id. at 137. The authority for the Court's test rests in the due process clause of the 14th amendment,
which provides that "no State shall make or enforce any law which shall. . . deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law .
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. See
note 48 infra.
30. This second theory requires a remedy of inverse condemnation. See-note 8 supra.
31. See 1A. RATHKoPF, supra note 2, § 1.01.
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need not compensate the landowner who suffered financially when the
nuisance was enjoined. 32 The United States Supreme Court affirmed this
doctrine in Mugler v. Kansas.33 In Mugler, the Court determined that a
Kansas law prohibiting breweries was a valid exercise of police power
and that the resulting economic loss to an established brewery was not
34
compensable.
The Court in Hadacheck v. Sebastian35 emphasized the force and extent of the Mugler doctrine. The land use regulation challenged in Hadacheck forced an established brickyard to cease operation after residential
development had encroached upon the brickyard. Although the regulation
effectively diminished the brickyard's value from $800,000 to $60,000,36
the Court found that the regulation was a valid exercise of police power
37
and therefore no compensation was required.
The unlimited application of the Mugler doctrine was questioned, but
not overruled, in Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon.38 In an opinion by Justice
Holmes, the Supreme Court recognized that "[g]overnment hardly could
go on if to some extent values incident to property could not be diminished without paying for every such change in the general law." 39 Nevertheless, the Court also stated that "while property may be regulated to a
certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking." 40 In Pennsylvania Coal, however, the Court did not require the
government to pay compensation, even though the Court found that the
ordinance constituted a taking. 4' Instead it effectively invalidated the regulation by refusing to enforce its provisions. Thus, while the language in
32. Similarly, neighbors who successfully enjoin a local nuisance are not expected to compensate the person whose nuisance is enjoined. See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS, § 90,
at 602-06 (4th ed. 1971). But see Spur Indus., Inc. v. Del E. Webb Dev. Co., 108 Ariz. 178, 494
P.2d 700 (1972).
33. 123 U.S. 623 (1887).
34. Id. at 668-69.
35. 239 U.S. 394 (1915).
36. Id.at405.
37. Id. at410-414.
38. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
39. Id.at413.
40. Id. at415.
41. There is some controversy about how Justice Holmes was using the word "taking." Because
the remedy for a fifth amendment taking is just compensation, see note 8 supra, Justice Holmes may
not have been using "taking" in its constitutional sense at all. See Note, Eldridge v. City of Palo
Alto: Aberration OrNew DirectionIn Land Use Law?, 28 HASTINGS L. J. 1569, 1574-76 (1977).
Justice Brennan in his dissenting opinion in San Diego Gas & Electric acknowledges this interpretation, but maintains that "this view ignores the coal company's repeated claim before the Court that
the Pennsylvania statute took its property without just compensation." 450 U.S. at 649 n. 14.
Justice Brennan also insists that a taking always requires just compensation, id. at 654, and explains the absence of a compensation award in Pennsylvania Coal on the basis that no one had asked
for it. Id. at 650-51 n. 17. But see note 78 infra.

556

Land Use Takings and Due Process
PennsylvaniaCoal may be read to indicate that valid exercises of governmental police powers may be a taking if they go "too far," the effect of
the decision was to invalidate an exercise of-police power on the basis of
its unreasonable or confiscatory nature. 42 The application of the "too
far" test to takings claims has spawned a confusing and often contradic43
tory body of law.
B.

Zoning as a Valid Police Power

Methods of municipal land use regulation made a subtle but significant
shift in the 1920's. Rather than enact regulations that prohibited specific
existing uses from a defined area, municipalities began to limit defined
areas to specific uses. This type of land use zoning, 4 rather than enjoining existing nuisances, attempts to avoid their development. Zoning does
not, however, avoid the problem of frustrating the expectations of land
owners and developers.
Because zoning ordinances directly further the public good by preventing nuisances, the Supreme Court upheld them as valid police powers in
42. In this sense Holmes'- analysis is virtually indistinguishable from the due process analysis
used in Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133 (1894), to test the validity of an exercise of police power. See
generally note 29 supra (discussing Lawton). The criteria and remedy are the same in both cases. The
critical difference is that Holmes, in PennsylvaniaCoal, called his "too far" test a fifth amendment
takings test, not a test for 14th amendment due process. This difference is so profound that one
authority suggests that Holmes may have.effectively rewritten the Constitution. F. BOSSELMAN, D.
CALLIES, & J.BANTA, THE TAKING IssUE 124-38 (1973).
" 43. One distinguished commentator recently said, "The law of takings, at least as expressed by
the Supreme Court, has essentially been without doctrinal advance for fifty years, and the two opposing and inconsistent lines of authority have not been explained or resolved; they are simply there."
Oakes, Property Rights In ConstitutionalAnalysis Today, 56 WAsH. L. REv. 583, 607 (1981). See
also Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness:Comments On the EthicalFoundationsOf "Just
Compensation" Law, 80 HARV. L. REv. 1165, 1196-1201 (1967) (suggesting that the distinctions
used to identify "too far" are illusory); Stoebuck, Police Power, Takings, and Due Process, 37
WASH. & LEa L. REv. 1057, 1070 (1980) (suggesting that the "too far" test is a mislabelled application of due process criteria). The Supreme Court in Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438
U.S. 104 (1978), admits that it, "quite simply, has been unable to develop any 'set formula'-for
determining" when a "taking" has occurred. Id.. at 124. Even Justice Brennan noted in San Diego
Gas & Electric that, in the regulatory sense, identifying a "taking" is "the most haunting jurisprudential problem in the field of contemporary land-use law. . . one that may be the lawyer's equivalent of the physicist's hunt for the quark." 450 U.S. at 649-50 n. 15 (quoting C. HAAR, LAND-UsE
PLANNING 766 (3d ed. 1977)). Besides Michelman, several commentators have attempted to reconcile the confusing case law into workable criteria for determining what constitutes a taking, but with
limited success. See Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36 (1964); Van Alstyne,
supranote 8.
44. Zoning did not become a judicially sanctioned police power in the United States until early in
the 20th century. This can probably be attributed to the tendency of United States courts to afford
private property rights the same protections as personal liberties. See J. CRIBBEr, PRINCIPLES OF THE
LAW OF PROPERTY 398 (1975). At least one commentator sees this tendency reemerging. Oakes, supranote 43, at 621-26.
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Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty. 45 The Court conditioned the validity
of zoning ordinances on two factors: (1) The zoning ordinance must advance legitimate public interests, 46 and (2) The effect of the ordinance
must not be unreasonable or confiscatory. 47 This two-pronged test basically follows the due process test traditionally used to determine the validity of exercises of police powers in general. 48 The Euclid opinion,
coming four years after Pennsylvania Coal, essentially incorporates both
the Mugler doctrine and the "too far" test of Pennsylvania Coal.49 Under
the Euclid test a zoning ordinance must advance a legitimate public purpose, but must not be too burdensome upon the landowner.
This test was applied again by the Court in Nectow v. City of Cambridge.50 In Nectow, the Court balanced the two prongs of the Euclid test
in determining that the challenged zoning ordinance, which prohibited
industrial development on the plaintiff's land, was an invalid exercise of
police power. 5 1 The landowner was later relieved of the oppressive regu45. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
46. Id. at 395.
47. Id. at 386.
48. The Euclid Court merely takes the due process criteria set forth in Lawton v. Steele, 152
U.S. 133 (1894), and applies them to zoning regulations. See generally note 29 supra (discussing
Lawton). The Lawton rationale has survived the demise of other aspects of substantive due process
and is still favorably cited by the Court. See, e.g., Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 595
(1962). Similarly, the Euclid test still determines the validity of zoning ordinances, but Euclid's
criteria are no longer framed as a test for substantive due process, but rather as a test for regulatory
"takings." See Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260-61 (1980). This evolution has created
considerable confusion and inconsistency in judicial language. See note 43 supra. Whether labelled
as a test of substantive due process or mislabelled as a "takings" test, land use regulation under
attack is judged by the same criteria-the two-pronged Euclid test. To be technically accurate, however, Euclid's two-pronged analysis should be applied as a measure of substantive due process. See
Oakes, supra note 43, at 591-94; Stoebuck, supra note 43, at 1069-70. At least one state court has
expressly recognized this important distinction. Fred F. French Inv. Co. v. City of New York, 39
N.Y.2d 587, 350 N.E.2d 381,385 N.Y.S.2d 5, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 990 (1976).
Professor Stoebuck identifies the Lawton test as having three rather than two prongs, but the same
considerations are present in either formulation. Use of the two-pronged formulation is advocated
here because it segregates the two principal components that can be analyzed separately: (I) The
ordinance's effect on society generally, and (2) The ordinance's effect on any one person. Furthermore, the two-pronged test is consistent with the Euclid Court's approach.
49. Holmes' "too far" analysis might be more accurately viewed as a mislabelled application of
the due process criteria of Lawton and Mugler. See notes 42 and 48 supra.
50. 277 U.S. 138 (1928).
51. The plaintiff in Nectow owned land directly across the street from an industrial development.
His land, however, was zoned residential by the city of Cambridge. The plaintiff had a tentative
contract to sell the land for further industrial development, but the buyer refused to comply when the
city of Cambridge enacted the zoning ordinance. 277 U.S. at 187. The Court found that the injury to
the plaintiff was "clearly established." Id. at 188. The Court invalidated the ordinance on the basis
that it failed to serve a public purpose because the land was not best suited for residential development. Id. at 187. Thus the Court's analysis seems ultimately to rely on balancing the effect on the
landowner with the magnitude of potential public benefit. See id. at 188-89. This subjective weighing of the two prongs of the Euclid test typifies analysis used to determine the validity of land use
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lations, but received no compensation. Following Nectow, the Court did
not hear another case involving zoning disputes until 1974.52 Consequently the states, bound by the two-pronged criteria of Euclid, were free
to define the substantive limits within which zoning ordinances would be
valid exercises of police power.
Many landowners use the "too far" language of Pennsylvania Coal as
a basis for challenging zoning ordinances as fifth amendment takings requiring just compensation rather than the two-pronged Euclid test to invalidate the offensive ordinances. 53 Nevertheless, most state and federal
courts have responded to these takings challenges not by awarding compensation but by applying the Euclid due process test and invalidatingthe
54
zoning ordinance if it failed.
The application of the due process test to takings claims has resulted in
confusion because the proper remedy for a takings claim would seem to
be inverse condemnation, not invalidation. 55 In theory, a taking requires
that the landowner be justly compensated for the diminished value of the
land, not that the land be returned to its unregulated status. Furthermore,
governments should be allowed to take land in return for just compensation only if done pursuant to a valid exercise of police power. 56 This
would mean that zoning ordinances could never constitute takings because the second prong of the Euclid test declares invalid any exercise of
the zoning police power that goes too far.57

ordinances. See, e.g., Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962). See also Note, Balancing Private Loss Against Public Gain to Testfor a Violation of Due Process or a Taking Without Just Compensation, 54 WASH. L. REv. 315 (1979) (analyzing whether or not balancing is appropriate for this
purpose); text accompanying notes 95-98 infra (identifying Justice Brennan's abandonment of balancing in his dissent in San Diego Gas & Electric).
52. Oakes, supranote 43, at 617 n.215.
53. See note 8 supra; text accompanying notes 38-43 supra.
54. Federal courts have never granted inverse condemnation to rectify an oppressive zoning ordinance. Pamel Corp. v. Puerto Rican Highway Auth., 621 F.2d 33 (1st Cir. 1980). The remedy, as in
Nectow, has always been invalidation of the ordinance.
For state authority see, e.g., Davis v. Pima County, 121 Ariz. 343, 590 P.2d 459 (1978), cert.
denied, 442 U.S. 942 (1979); Gold Run, Ltd. v. Board of County Comm'n, 38 Colo. App. 44, 554
P.2d 317 (1976); Mailman Dev. Corp. v. City of Hollywood, 286 So. 2d 614 (Fla.), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 844 (1974); Holaway v. City of Pipestone, 269 N.W.2d 28 (Minn. 1978); Eck v. City of
Bismarck, 283 N.W.2d 193 (N.D. 1979); Fred F. French Inv. Co. v. City of New York, 39 N.Y.2d
587, 350 N.E.2d 381, 385 N.Y.S.2d 5, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 990 (1976).
55. See note 8 supra.
56. This is a corollary to the proposition that if the exercise of police power was invalid, no
acquisition of property actually occurred. See Stoebuck, supranote 43, at 1062, 1081-82.
57. See notes 45-49 and accompanying text supra.
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Recent Supreme Court Responses to ChallengedLand Use
Ordinances

The Supreme Court has never decided whether a land use regulation
that goes too far ever constitutes a fifth amendment taking requiring the
payment of just compensation. In fact, following the decision in Pennsylvania Coal, no land use regulation has been found by the Court to be a
taking. In Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead,58 the Court faced a takings
challenge to a city ordinance that effectively forced an active sand and
gravel pit to close. The Court relied on Mugler, stating that "[ijf this
ordinance is otherwise a valid exercise of the town's police powers, the
fact that it deprives the property of its most beneficial use does not render
it unconstitutional." 59 The Court then determined that the ordinance's effects were not unreasonable and upheld the ordinance as a valid exercise
60
of police power under the two-pronged due process test of Euclid.
The next takings claim based on a land use ordinance reached the Court
in Penn CentralTransportationCo. v. New York City. 6 1 The challenged
zoning ordinance prohibited further construction atop the Grand Central
Terminal in New York City. The Court accepted the New York court's
finding that the ordinance advanced legitimate public interests and analyzed the case only on the basis of whether the city had gone "too far" in
diminishing the value of Penn Central's property. The Court decided it
had not. 62 The opinion, written by Justice Brennan, suggested that even if
the ordinance had been found to be a taking, invalidation, not just com63
pensation, would have been the appropriate remedy.
58.

369U.S.590(1961).

59. Id. at 592. The Court goes on to state: "This is not to say, however, that governmental action
in the form of regulation cannot be so onerous as to constitute a taking which constitutionally requires
compensation." Id. at 594. This statement does not take into account, however, that takings analysis
applies only if the ordinance "is otherwise a valid police regulation." Id. See text accompanying
notes 55-57 supra.

60. The Court cites to the "classic statement of the rule in Lawton v. Steele," 152 U.S. 133
(1894), discussed in note 29 supra. 369 U.S. at 594-95. See note 48 supra.
61.

438 U.S. 104(1978).

62.

Id. at 136-38.

63. Justice Brennan stated:
The question of what constitutes a "taking" for purposes of the Fifth Amendment has proved to

be a problem of considerable difficulty . . . . [Tihis .Court, quite simply, has been unable to
develop any "set formula" for determining when "justice and fairness" require that economic
injuries caused by public action be compensated by the government, rather than remain disproportionately concentrated on a few persons . . . . Indeed, we have frequently observed that
whether a particularrestriction will be rendered invalid by the government's failure to pay for

any losses proximately caused by it depends largely "upon the particular circumstances [in that]
case."
Id. at 123-24 (emphasis added). Thus Justice Brennan acknowledges that invalidation is an appropriate response when a zoning ordinance constitutes a taking.
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The next case bringing the taking issue to the Supreme Court was Agins
v. City of Tiburon. 64 In Agins, the challenged zoning ordinance limited
the potential development of the plaintiff's land to five single family
dwellings. The plaintiff brought suit for inverse condemnation damages
of two million dollars asserting that the zoning ordinance was a fifth
amendment taking. The California Supreme Court struck down the-claim,
saying:
[A]lthough a landowner so aggrieved may challenge both the constitutionality of the ordinance and the manner in which it is applied to his property
by seeking to establish the invalidity of the ordinance either through the
remedy of declaratory relief or mandamus, he may not recover damages on
65
the theory of inverse condemnation.
By foreclosing inverse condemnation remedies, the California court's
holding in Agins appears to say that zoning ordinances are never properly
66
challenged as being fifth amendment takings.
Agins claimed before the United States Supreme Court that the California court could not properly limit the remedies of oppressively zoned landowners. The Court, however, did not reach this issue because it affirmed
the decision on the basis that no taking had occurred. 67 The Court noted
that the zoning ordinance still allowed the plaintiff to construct five residences on his five acres, and that this was not unreasonable or confiscatory. 68
Following Agins, the California courts' position remained that inverse
condemnation awards are not available in response to challenged zoning
ordinances. The constitutionality of this position was challenged again in
San Diego Gas & Electric. Once again the majority failed to reach the
merits of this issue, this time on jurisdictional grounds. 69 The dissent,

64. 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
65. Agins v. City of Tiburon, 24 Cal. 3d 266, 269-70, 598 P.2d 25, 26, 157 Cal. Rptr. 372,
373, aff d447 U.S. 255 (1980).
66. California courts before Agins had confronted the issue whether inverse condemnation may
ever be an appropriate attack against a zoning ordinance. In HFH, Ltd. v. Superior Court, 15 Cal. 3d
508, 542 P.2d 237, 125 Cal. Rptr. 365 (1975), the California Supreme Court held.that landowners
subject to zoning-induced diminutions of property value do not have constitutional claims of inverse
condemnation. One year later, however, the same court denied a petition of review to Eldridge v.
City of Palo Alto, 57 Cal, App. 3d 613, 129 Cal. Rptr. 575 (1976). The California Court of Appeal in
Eldridge upheld the right of an aggrieved landowner to acknowledge the validity of the zoning ordinance, but nonetheless bring suit for inverse condemnation. Id. at 621, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 579. The
California Supreme Court in Agins expressly disapproved Eldridge. 24 Cal. 3d at 273, 598 P.2d at
28, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 375.
67. 447 U.S. at 263.
68. Id. at 262.
69. See text accompanying notes 71-74 infra.
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however, gave some indication of how the Court may treat this issue
70
when it does reach the merits.
II.

THE COURT'S REASONING

A.

The Majority Opinion

The majority of the Court dismissed San Diego Gas & Electric Com71
pany's taking claim citing lack of jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1257.
That statute limits the jurisdiction of the Court to hearing only final judgments of state courts. 72 The majority opinion, written by Justice Blackmun and joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justices White and Stevens,
claimed that there was no final judgment in the California court on the
issue of whether a taking had occurred. 73 Furthermore, the Court noted
that the company was still free to seek invalidation of the zoning ordinance and open-space plan at the superior court level. 74 The majority did
view the California court as saying that the company was not entitled to
monetary relief even if there was a taking and acknowledged that such an
automatic foreclosure of remedies presented federal constitutional issues
that "are not to be cast aside lightly." 75 Nevertheless, because "further
proceedings are necessary to resolve the federal question whether there
has been a taking at all," 76 the majority did not reach these issues. Justice
Rehnquist, concurring, rejected the case under the same jurisdictional
analysis.77

B.

The Dissent's Proposals

Justice Brennan's dissent, joined by Justices Stewart, Marshall, and
Powell, reached a different result on the jurisdiction issue. From the dissent's perspective the California court, by disallowing monetary compensation, implicitly made the final determination that no "taking" had oc70. See text accompanying notes 78-90 infra.
71. (1976).See450U.S. at630-31 n.l0.
72. Section 1257 states:
"Final judgments or decrees rendered by the highest court of a State in
which adecision could be had, may be reviewed by the Supreme Court .
(emphasis added).
73. 450U.S.at633.
74. Id. at632. The majority also seemed persuaded that,
because the company had never been
refused permission to develop, it was still "free to pursue reasonable investment." Id. at631 n.12.
75. Id. at 633.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 633-36. Justice Rehnquist stated that:
If I were satisfied that this appeal was from a "final judgment or decree" of the California
Court of Appeal, as that term is used in 28 U.S.C. § 1257, 1 would have little difficulty in
agreeing with much of what is said in the dissenting opinion of Justice Brennan.
Id. at 633-34. See text accompanying notes 21-23 supra.
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curred on the ground that there can be no "taking" without just
compensation. 78 The dissent viewed the company's chance to obtain declaratory relief invalidating the ordinance as merely an option to pursue a
different constitutional theory. 7 9 Therefore the dissent claimed that the
California court had made a "classic final judgment." 80 Overcoming the
jurisdictional issue, the dissent reached the merits of the question whether
the California court may constitutionally bar the company from the fifth
amendment takings remedy of inverse condemnation.
Justice Brennan cited Agins, Penn Central, Goldblatt, and Pennsylvania Coal as standing for the proposition that land use regulations can constitute fifth amendment takings if they go "too far.' '81 The dissent noted
that the typical governmental taking occurs only when the government
actually occupies the land, 82 but nonetheless maintained that land use regulations may just as effectively "deprive the owner of all or most of his
interest in the property," and therefore constitute a taking. 83 In determining whether a taking had in fact occurred, Justice Brennan said the focus
84
should be solely on the imposition forced upon the landowner.
The dissent emphasized that if any governmental action is found to be a
taking, inverse condemnation must be awarded because "mere invalidation would fall far short of fulfilling the fundamental purpose of the Just
Compensation Clause.' '85 The dissent would not require a municipality to
purchase the burdened property outright when it is guilty of a zoning-taking. Rather, the municipality has the option of rescinding the offending
ordinance and paying compensation only for a temporary taking. 86 This
payment would constitute a use fee "for the period commencing on the
date the regulation first effected the 'taking,' and ending on the date the
78. The dissent vigorously argued that "takings" and just compensation are inseparable. The
dissent interprets the Court's past decisions as having "consistently recognized that the just compensation requirement in the fifth amendment is not precatory: once there is a 'taking,' compensation
must be awarded." Id. at 654. This is a rather dubious proposition, however, when applied to regulatory "takings." For instance, in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922), the first
Supreme Court case to hold that a valid police power may be a "taking," no just compensation was
required. In fact, no Supreme Court decision has ever awarded just compensation in response to a
regulatory "taking." See cases cited in note 54 supra. A recent opinion written by Justice Brennan
suggests that invalidation rather than compensation is an appropriate remedy for an ordinance that
constitutes a taking. Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978). See
note 63 and accompanying text supra.
79. 450 U.S. at 643. This "different" theory would presumably be that the ordinance was void
for violating the due process clause of the 14th amendment.
80. Id. at 646.
81. Id. at 647-49.
82. Id. at651.
83. Id. at 653.
84. Id. at 656-57.
85. Id. at 656.
86. Id. at 658-59.
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government entity chooses to rescind or otherwise amend the regulation. " '87 In this way, inverse condemnation would always accompany a
88
successful taking claim.
The dissent refused to consider any policy arguments in favor of limiting the liability that municipalities would unavoidably confront in enacting zoning ordinances. 89 Justice Brennan claimed that the relationship be-

tween taking and just compensation awards was an express constitutional
guarantee that transcends any considerations of public policy. 90
The dissent's position can thus be summarized in three points. First, if

a land use regulation is challenged as a "taking," the judicial determination of the claim turns solely on the degree of imposition forced upon the
landowner. Second, if a land use regulation is found to be a "taking,"

just compensation must be awarded. Third, if the ordinance is later rescinded, that compensation will be measured as a use fee or "temporary
taking."
III.
A.

ANALYSIS
The PracticalEffect of the Dissent'sProposals

The judicial test used to determine the validity of zoning ordinances
has traditionally been the two-pronged Euclid test weighing the public
benefit against the private burden, which is essentially a test of fourteenth
amendment due process. 9 1 Even when zoning ordinances are challenged
as a fifth amendment taking, courts have applied the Euclid rationale and
invalidated the ordinances when they failed the test. 92 Thus, the twopronged Euclid test has evolved into the test for zoning ordinance takings. 93 The Euclid test determines the validity of a zoning ordinance by
balancing its two prongs. 94 In his dissent in San Diego Gas & Electric,
however, Justice Brennan suggests that the only factor to be considered in
determining whether a zoning ordinance constitutes a taking is the magnitude of the public burden imposed on the landowner. The degree of public
benefit is immaterial. 95 Thus, Justice Brennan's position apparently aban87.
i. at 658.
88. This doctrine is consistent with the dissent's assertion that just compensation must accompany takings. See note 78 supra.
89. See450 U.S. at 660-61.
90. Id. at 661
91. See notes 45-52 and accompanying text supra: IA. RATHKOPF. supra note 2. § 4.01.
92. See cases cited in note 54 supra.
93. See Agins v. City of Tiburon. 447 U.S. 255, 260-61 (1980): text accompanying note 100
infra.
94. See note 51 supra.
95. See 450 U.S. at 656-57.
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dons the traditional test of balancing public and private interests, 96 and
relies solely on the Pennsylvania Coal "too far" test.
This new perspective is inconsistent with the takings analysis in Justice
Brennan's majority opinion in Penn Central TransportationCo. v. New
York City. 97 That opinion stated:
[I]n instances in which a state tribunal reasonably concluded that "the
health, safety, morals, or general welfare" would be promoted by prohibiting particular contemplated uses of land, this Court has upheld land-use regulations that destroyed or adversely affected recognized real property interests. .

.

. Zoning laws are, of course, the classic example .... 98

Likewise, in Agins v. City of Tiburon,99 heard only nine months before
San Diego Gas & Electric, the Court said that a zoning ordinance may
be a taking "if the ordinance does not substantially advance legitimate
state interests . . . or denies an owner economically viable use of his
land. . . .[T]he question necessarily requires a weighing of private and
public interests." 100 Justice Brennan now says that the public benefit and
the burden on the landowner should no longer be balanced but rather
should be analyzed for distinct causes of action. 101 The dissenting opinion
fails, however, to provide an adequate rationale for this significant departure from the traditional doctrine.
Besides implicitly altering the well-established rationale used for determining whether a regulation has gone too far, the dissent also takes the
position that monetary compensation must follow such a taking in every
case. 102 Most courts that have considered this issue have concluded that
compensation for a regulatory taking is inappropriate if invalidation of the
ordinance relieves the plaintiff's burden. 103 Even in Pennsylvania Coal,
the only case in which the Supreme Court found the challenged regulation
to be a taking, the Court's remedy was to refuse to enforce the offensive
04
regulation rather than require compensation. 1
The dissent's reasons for viewing existing takings doctrine in this form
96. The history of challenges to zoning ordinances chronicles the necessity and advantages of
balancing public benefits and private losses. The Court seemed to recognize this in Penn Central
Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124-27 (1978). This same perspective is also implicit
in the decisions of Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962), and Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239
U.S. 394 (1915).
97. 438 U.S. 104(1978).
98. Id. at 125.
99. 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
100. Id. at260-61.
101. 450 U.S. at 656 n.23.
102. See note 78 supra.
103. See note 54 and accompanying text supra.
104. See notes 41-42 and accompanying text supra.
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are not altogether certain. One possibility suggested by the dissent is that

over-regulated landowners are left without adequate remedies if monetary
awards are judicially foreclosed. 105 Although the dissent's proposals re-

spond to this inadequacy, they create even more serious problems by unduly inhibiting municipalities' abilities to regulate land use.
B.

Municipalities' Ability to Regulate Land Use

When enacting zoning ordinances, municipalities implicitly find that
the long-term benefits to be realized by society outweigh the burdens
borne by the regulated landowners. 106 If these burdens are not so concentrated or severe that they violate the Euclid test's second prong, the zoning ordinance is a valid exercise of the municipality's police power. 107 By
authorizing this municipal authority, the Euclid doctrine encourages municipalities to guide their orderly development. 108
The dissent's proposals, by forcing municipalities to pay inverse condemnation claims for what would otherwise be invalid exercises of municipalities' police powers, would discourage municipalities from performing their land use planning responsibilities. 109 This is especially true
when the land being regulated has great potential profitability in compari105. See 450 U.S. at 655-56 n.22. The dissent argued in support of its position that if a municipal ordinance is merely invalidated by a successful landowner's suit, the municipality is free to
reenact a slightly altered ordinance and force the landowner to judicially challenge the new regulations. Id. This process could theoretically go on indefinitely.
The dissent fails to examine other possibilities that would more equitably prevent the situation
described above. For instance, under this Note's proposal, the landowner would be entitled to collect
actual damages, and even punitive damages, in response to such bad faith municipal behavior. See
note 136 infra.
106. If this were the case, the ordinance would probably fail the Lawton v. Steele test for valid
exercises of police power. See note 29 supra; text accompanying note 46 supra.
107. See text accompanying notes 45-49 supra.
108. See Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 386-89 (1926).
109. See, e.g., Note, Eldridge v. City of Palo Alto: Aberration or New Direction in Land Use
Law?, 28 HASTINGS L. REV. 1569, 1597-99 (1977); Note, Inverse Condemnation: Its A vailability in
Challenging the Validity of a Zoning Ordinance, 26 STAN. L. REV. 1439, 1449-50 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Note, Inverse Condemnation]. Justice Brennan acknowledges the existence of this important policy consideration, but responds that "the applicability of express constitutional guarantees is
not a matter to be determined on the basis of policy judgments made by the legislative, executive, or
judicial branches." 450 U.S. at 661. Therefore, when a "taking" has occurred, considerations of
public policy cannot prevent the award of just compensation. The public policy ignored by Justice
Brennan, however, involves defining what should be a "taking." Because the Constitution does not
define "taking," and because the "too far" test only begs the question, perhaps considerations of
public policy are critically important.
Justice Brennan's position assumes that a temporary zoning restriction can deprive a landowner of
"property" in the fifth amendment sense. Furthermore, the position assumes that deprivation of this
kind of "property" goes "too far." These assumptions involve very fundamental judgments about
the degree to which government can constitutionally regulate land use. Such judgments should not be
made without deference to public policy. Indeed, such judgments define public policy.
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0 With inverse condemnation claims
son to an austere municipal budget. 11
available, the only certain way municipalities can avoid payment of just
compensation is to avoid regulation, regardless of the public purposes the
ordinance advances. Justice Brennan responded to this argument, saying
this potential liability is a positive incentive encouraging municipalities to
"err on the constitutional side of police power regulations." "'1Although
this potential liability may indeed encourage municipalities to be more
conservative in their land management strategies, there are ample incentives already present to insure that municipalities err in favor of constitutionality. These include the costs of litigation and administration that result from overzealous regulation. 112
The dangers of this chilling effect on land use regulations are magnified
by the absence of a well-defined demarcation of what constitutes a taking.
The "too far" test is one of the more mystic determinations of the judiciary. 113 The Supreme Court itself has acknowledged that the determination
of what constitutes a taking is "a question of degree-and therefore cannot be disposed of by general propositions." 114 In order to err on the side
of constitutionality with any degree of confidence, local officials would
be forced to adopt far more conservative land use controls.
Furthermore, this chilling effect would operate inequitably. To avoid
devastating liability in the face of an evanescent "too far" test, municipal
authorities could ill afford aggressive land use regulation of parcels with
great potential value. Such disaster-avoidance conservatism would tend,
therefore, to aid the owners of the most valuable tracts of land at the expense of the general public. Furthermore, judicially imposed liability
which discourages municipalities from performing their official duties
runs counter to the established policies of the Court.115

110. Inverse condemnation awards are measured by the actual economic value of the land being
taken. See note 8 supra. But see note 122 infra. The dissent would apply the same criteria to "temporary takings." 450 U.S. at 658-59.
I11. Id. at 661 n.26.
112. Justice Brennan indicates that these overhead costs, along with the possibility of ordinance
invalidation, are insufficient deterrents to keep municipalities from regulating landowners in an unconstitutional fashion. Id. at 655-56 n.22. This presumably provides the basis for his advocating the
expansion of the inverse condemnation claim. The dissent fails to consider, however, the possibility
of allowing damage remedies, rather than inverse condemnation awards, in response to invalid zoning. See text accompanying notes 125-137 infra.
113. Seenote43supra.
114. San Diego Gas & Electric, 450 U.S. at 649 (quoting Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260
U.S. 393,416 (1922)).
115. The Court has only recently abrogated the doctrine of governmental immunity. The Court's
policy has been, however, to refuse to abrograte the doctrine completely in cases where liability
would inhibit the performance of the government's official duties. See Carlson v. Green 446 U.S.
14, 18-19 (1980).
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Invalid Land Use Regulations as Inverse Condemnation Claims

Even if owners of invalidly zoned land are not adequately compensated
by the invalidation of the offending ordinance, inverse condemnation is
an inappropriate method of filling the void. A municipality should not be
forced to acquire property or property rights that it does not want. 116 Such
acquisitions should be made by legislative decision, not judicial fiat. 117
Justice Brennan recognized this argument and stated that courts should
not force a municipality into property acquisition if the municipality rescinds the ordinance.1 8 Under Justice Brennan's analysis, however, the
municipality is still liable after rescission for an inverse condemnation
award to compensate for the temporary taking. 119
The automatic awarding of compensation for the temporary taking of
the land may result in a windfall for the landowner, as demonstrated by
the facts of San Diego Gas & Electric. If the company prevailed on its
inverse condemnation action, the city, after rescinding the zoning ordinance, would have to pay the company for the "use" of the land for the
time the ordinance was in effect. The company would thus be compensated whether or not it had suffered any actual damage. If the company
had no desire or opportunity to sell the land while the challenged ordinance was in effect, the invalidation of the ordinance would place the
company in the same position it would have occupied had the ordinance
never been enacted. Yet the Brennan analysis still requires compensation.
This additional remedy is an unnecessary windfall.
The prospects of a windfall will encourage landowners to challenge
land use regulations on takings theories. The likelihood of such litigation
20
pressure could exacerbate the chilling effect discussed above. 1
Justice Brennan's proposed inverse condemnation awards are not only
an improper response to the landowner's situation, they similarly misconceive the municipalities' position. Justice Brennan views the inverse
condemnation award as resulting in the public bearing the costs of the
116.

An inverse condemnation award theoretically completes an eminent domain acquisition.

See note 8 supra.
117. See Note, Inverse Condemnation, supra note 109, at 1450.

118. The dissent states:
[Clontrary to appellant's claim that San Diego must formally condemn its property and pay full
fair market value, nothing in the Just Compensation Clause empowers a court to order a government entity to condemn the property and pay its full fair market value, where the "taking"
already effected is temporary and reversible and the government wants to halt the "taking." Just

as the government may cancel condemnation proceedings before passage of title. . . . or abandon property it has temporarily occupied or invaded. ...
it must have the same power to rescind a regulatory "taking."
450 U.S. at 658.
119.
120.
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See text accompanying notes 109-112 supra.
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benefits it has received. 121 Compensating a temporary taking would then
be analogous to a retroactive use fee, just as if a lease had been prospectively negotiated for the time the overreaching ordinance was in effect. 122
The primary benefits and purposes of land use planning, however, are
long-range in nature and designed as much to benefit the evolution of our
habitat as to provide for immediate gratification. 123 This is especially true
with open-space plans. Thus, even though the public would be paying for
a taking under Justice Brennan's approach, it often will receive little, if
any, true benefit from the temporary taking. Such a payment to landowners is more properly characterized, and more properly computed, as damages.
IV.

AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH

A primary concern of the dissent is that the over-regulated landowner is
left without an adequate remedy if barred from obtaining an inverse condemnation award. 124 This may be true in some situations. For example, a
landowner who is foreclosed from an inverse condemnation award may
prevail in a suit for declaratory relief, but may not be adequately compensated. 125 Although Justice Brennan's proposals would compensate those
landowners on the basis of a temporary taking, his proposals also com121. 450 U.S. at 656.
122. Exactly how the dissent proposes to calculate the just compensation for temporary "takings" is not clear. The dissent says both that the compensation is to leave the landowner in the same
position as if there had been no "taking," 450 U.S. at 657, and that the award is to serve as compensation for the use of the property while the regulation is in effect. Id. at 658-59. These two ideas lead
to different results if the landowner was holding open land for speculative purposes. Since the speculating landowner is in the same position after the regulation is rescinded, one might read the dissent to
say that no compensation is necessary. On the other hand, the dissent clearly establishes that a temporary taking requires a use fee in every case. See note 78 supra.
Determining the amount ofjust compensation is a confusing and difficult task even when the taking
is not complicated by being temporary in nature. See Note, Inverse Condemnation, supranote 109, at
1451 n.54.
123. This was, for instance, clearly the intention of the Euclid Court when they upheld the zoning process as a valid police power. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 386-94
(1926).
124. 450 U.S. at 654-57.
125. Because declaratory relief places the landowner in the same position that the landowner was
in before the regulation, only in the unusual case would additional compensation be necessary. Justice Brennan suggests the case where the municipality regulates in a harassing or bad faith manner.
See note 105 supra. Additional compensation would be appropriate under those circumstances. See
note 136 infra.
Another example would be an ordinance that curtails existing uses of the land. If, for example, the
landowner is profiting by renting land for camping, parking area, or gathering wild rice, and the
invalid ordinances halt these activities during the legal challenge, the municipality should be liable to
the landowner for the damages caused by the unconstitutional regulation. See note 135 infra.

569

Washington Law Review

Vol. 57:551, 1982

pensate landowners who have suffered no loss. 126 A better remedy would
be one that is less broad and that awards compensation to the landowner
only when the landowner has suffered provable damages.
A possible substitute remedy is 42 U.S.C. § 1983,127 which provides
that any person injured by deprivation of constitutional rights is entitled to
collect damages. Justice Brennan states in San Diego Gas & Electric that
this remedy is available in response to invalid zoning ordinances that fail
to advance legitimate public interests, 128 the first prong of the Euclid test.
Justice Brennan's analysis should be expanded to include both prongs of
the Euclid test.
If a landowner is subject to a zoning ordinance that goes too far, that
ordinance fails the fourteenth amendment due process test1 29 and the
30
landowner has been deprived of a constitutionally guaranteed right. 1
Therefore, that landowner may claim provable damages under section
1983.131 Under this analysis a state court does not completely foreclose
landowners from a monetary remedy when it bars claims of inverse condemnation. Although this damage remedy for constitutional violations
has not been expressly approved by the Supreme Court for use against
municipalities, 132 two federal courts of appeal have indicated that section
1983 provides an appropriate remedy in land use disputes.133 If the Supreme Court affirms the availability of such damages, section 1983 would
provide an equitable recovery for owners of invalidly zoned land.
Unlike Justice Brennan's proposition, the use of section 1983 damages
is easily reconciled with existing doctrines governing challenges to land
use ordinances. The well-established Euclid test would continue to determine the validity of zoning regulations. Courts could continue to balance
private loss and public gain in determining whether a regulation has gone
126.

See text following note 119 supra.

127.

(1976). This section states:

Civil actionfor deprivation of rights. Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance.

regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any
citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of
any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the

party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
128. 450 U.S. at 656 n.23.
129. See note 48 supra.
130. See note 29 supra.
131. See Rockwell, Constitutional Violations In Zoning: The Emerging Section 1983 Damage
Remedy, 23 U. FLA. L. REV. 168 (1981); see also Manley, Inverse Condemnation Under 42 U.S.C.
Section 1983, 12 URB. LAW. 276 (1980) (blurring, as the title suggests, the concepts of inverse con-

demnation and damages, but nonetheless advocating a restrained application of § 1983 damages to
oppressive land use regulations).
132.

Rockwell, supra note 131, at 178.

133. Gordon v. City of Warren, 579 F.2d 386, 390-91 (6th Cir. 1978); Jacobsen v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 558 F.2d 928,941-42 (9th Cir. 1977).
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too far. In addition, municipalities would pay for the actual damages they
cause, not for benefits they never receive. Damages, however, would
rarely be an appropriate response to invalid regulations on undeveloped
land. 134 Damages should be assessed primarily in response to ordinances
that directly affect current land uses. 135 Damages are also appropriate in
cases where municipal authorities take advantage of the unavailability of
inverse condemnation remedies by enacting invalid regulations in bad
faith. In those cases, punitive damages and attorney's fees should be im36
posed at the discretion of the court. 1
Under this proposed alternative, the San Diego Gas & Electric Company would not be limited to seeking declaratory relief, but would be free
to prove damages under section 1983. The facts of the case, however,
suggest that the company has suffered no actual damages. 137 This demonstrates how inequitable an inverse condemnation recovery would be under
these circumstances.
V.

CONCLUSION

A four justice minority of the Supreme Court indicated in San Diego
Gas & Electric that landowners subject to zoning ordinances that go too
far must be allowed to bring actions for inverse condemnation and that
successful actions must be accompanied by monetary compensation.
Both the majority and concurring opinions expressed support for this
proposition, but were unable to reach the merits on jurisdictional
grounds. Inverse condemnation, however, is an inappropriate response to
overly-restrictive zoning. Invalid zoning ordinances are better viewed as
being void for failure to provide the substantive due process guaranteed
by the Constitution. As void ordinances, they cannot be fifth amendment
134. Rockwell, supra note 131, at 193; see, e.g., City of Austin v. Teague, 570 S.W.2d 389
(Tex. 1978).
135. See note 125 supra. The judiciary should be hesitant to award damages due to harm to the
landowner's value expectations because Euclid and subsequent cases have clearly established that the
regulation of land use in the public interest is a valid police power which should be anticipated. Thus,
while land use regulations may dash the hopes of a landowner, they need not be seen as destroying
compensable expectations.
136. This would seem to be the appropriate response to the dissent's scenario, see note 105
supra. Section 1983 damages include punitive damages and attorney's fees at the discretion of the
court. See Rockwell, supranote 131, at 192.
137. Although San Diego Gas & Electric Company claims that the zoning ordinance had taken
its property through over-regulation, thereby rendering it useless, the company was nonetheless able
to sell 40 of the acres for $1.7 million in 1979. In addition, the company received an additional
$1,483,140 from ratepayers by virtue of the property being a rate base asset during the time of the
supposed temporary taking. In total, the company has received in revenue attributable to the "taken"
property almost as much as its original purchase price-and still owns 372 of the original 412 acres.
Brief for the Conservation Foundation, et al. at 13-14, San Diego Gas & Electric, 450 U.S. 621.
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takings of property that require just compensation.1 38 Instead the landowners are freed from the invalid regulations.
In certain situations mere freedom from the invalid regulations will not
compensate landowners adequately. Damage awards, as authorized under
42 U.S.C. § 1983, would be appropriate under these circumstances.
Kim C. Pflueger

138.

See note 56 and accompanying text supra.

